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Social Welfare in Sports Leagues with
Profit-Maximizing and/or Win-Maximizing
Clubs
Helmut M. Dietl,* Markus Lang,t and Stephan WernerJ
This article develops a cotitest model to compare social vv'elfare in homogeneous leagues in
which all clubs maximize identical objective functions with mixed leagues in which clubs
maximize different objective functions. We show that homogeneous leagues in which all clubs
are profit maxlmizers dominate all other leagues. Mixed leagues in which small-market clubs
are profit maximizers and large-market clubs are win maximizers (type-I mixed leagues) are
dominated by all other leagues. From a welfare perspective, large-market clubs win too often
in (purely) win-maximizing and type-I mixed leagues; whereas, small-market clubs win
too many games in (purely) profit-maximizing leagues and in mixed leagues in which large-
market clubs are profit maximizers and small-market clubs are win maximizers (type-II
mixed leagues). These results have important policy implications: Social welfare will increase
if clubs are reorganized from non-profit member associations to profit-maximizing corpora-
tions. Moreover, we show that revenue sharing decreases (increases) social welfare in mixed
(homogeneous) leagues.
JEL Classirication: C72, D6, L2, L83
1. Introduction
Welfare analysis is the heart of economics. There is a huge body of literature devoted to
the welfare effects of regulations, institutions, policies, and the like. Surprisingly, there are
hardly any welfare analyses in the professional team sports industry. We believe that the lack of
welfare analysis in professional team sports is caused by the confusion created by the so-called
uncertainty of outcome hypothesis (Rottenberg 1956; Neale 1964). According to this
hypothesis, fans prefer to attend games with an uncertain outcome and enjoy close
championship races. The uncertainty of outcome hypothesis describes one of the unique
economic characteristics of the team sports industry. Unlike Toyota, Microsoft, and Wal-Mart,
which benefit from weak competitors in their respective industries. Real Madrid and the New
York Yankees need strong competitors to maximize their revenues. In sports, a weak team
produces a negative externality on its stronger competitors.
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Based on the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis, professional team sports leagues have
introduced a variety of measures to increase competitive balance. Two of the most prominent
measures are reserve clauses' and revenue-sharing arrangements. Whether these measures
actually increase competitive balance is the most disputed question in the sports economics
literature. According to Rottenberg's invariance proposition,'^ the distribution of playing talent
between clubs in professional sports leagues does not depend on the allocation of property
rights to players' services. In particular, changes in property rights, such as the introduction of
a reserve clause, will not alter the allocation of players and therefore have no impact on
competitive balance. Quirk and El-Hodiri (1974), Fort and Quirk (1995), and Vrooman (1995)
extended this invariance proposition to gate revenue sharing. Invariance propositions provide
economists with tough challenges, both theoretically and empirically. Theoretically, it is
important to identify the exact assumptions under which such propositions hold. The empirical
challenge is to show whether these assumptions actually hold and lead to the predicted results.
So far, the empirical challenge has proved to be too tough because apart from the problems of
measuring competitive balance, it has been impossible to isolate the effect of single measures
such as revenue sharing or free agency on competitive balance.
A number of authors have taken on the theoretical challenge. Their analysis can be
grouped along two dimensions of assumptions: profit maximization versus win maximization
and fixed versus flexible supply of talent. Along the first dimension, club owners may be
modeled either as profit maximizers or win maximizers. Profit maximizers do not care about
winning percentages unless they affect profits. Win maximizers invest as much as they can into
playing talent and are only constrained by zero profit. The second dimension concerns the
elasticity of talent supply. Under the assumption of fixed supply, aggregate talent within the
league is constant, and the race for talent is a zero-sum game between owners. Under flexible
supply, owners can hire as much talent as they want at a constant (exogenous) wage rate.
According to this categorization, the invariance proposition with regard to revenue sharing is
derived under the assumptions of profit maximization and fixed supply. There is wide
agreement that the invariance proposition does not hold in leagues with either win-maximizing
owners or fiexible talent supply (see, e.g., Atkinson, Stanley, and Tschirhart 1988; Késenne
2000, 2005; Vrooman 2008). There is disagreement, however, on whether the invariance
proposition holds in a league with profit-maximizing owners and fixed talent supply.
Szymanski and Késenne (2004) argue that increased gate revenue sharing results in a more
uneven distribution of talent between large- and small-market clubs. This result contradicts the
invariance proposition with respect to gate revenue sharing.
Where does this disagreement come from? Obviously, Szymanski and Késenne work from
the same assumptions as do Quirk and El-Hodiri and others. The root of the disagreement is in
the underlying model conjectures. As Szymanski (2004) has shown, the assumption of fixed
talent supply is often used to justify Walrasian fixed-supply conjectures instead of contest-Nash
conjectures. Under Walrasian fixed-supply conjectures, the quantity of talent hired by at least
one club owner is determined by the choices of all the other club owners. In a two-club league,
the Walrasian fixed-supply conjecture collapses the non-cooperative choice of talents into a
' The reserve clause binds a player to his club beyond the expiration of his contract until the player either is released,
retires, or is traded to another club. Although the player's obligation to play for his club, as well as the club's obligation
to pay the player, is terminated, the player is not free to enter into another contract with another club.
^ Rottenberg's invariance proposition is often regarded as a predecessor of the famous Coase Theorem (see, e.g.. Fort
2005).
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choice of winning percentages by only one club owner. Under the Walrasian fixed-supply
conjectures, the "game" between profit-maximizing owners loses its non-cooperative character
and leads to results that are more in line with joint profit maximization.
We believe that the invariance proposition and the related literature on competitive
balance miss the point by raising the wrong question. In our view, it is much more important to
analyze the welfare effects of different assumptions and issues of league design, such as club
owner objectives and revenue sharing, than their effect on competitive balance. An exclusive
focus on competitive balance would only be justified if the uncertainty of outcome hypothesis
completely holds. If, on the other hand, social welfare does not monotonically increase as
competitive balance increases, an exclusive focus on the effects of different assumptions and
measures on competitive balance will result in inefficient policy conclusions.
There is strong evidence that competitive balance is not a good proxy for social welfare.
Theoretically, a fully competitive league does not maximize social welfare if clubs differ with
respect to market size. Large-market clubs have, on average, higher marginal revenues of wins
than do small-market clubs. As a result, league revenues (and profits) are maximized when the
large-market clubs have higher winning percentages than do their small-market rivals.
Empirical evidence supports the assumption that match attendance is maximized when the
home team's winning probability is about twice as large as that of the visiting team (e.g.,
Forrest and Simmons 2002; for an overview, see Borland and Macdonald 2003).
Given this evidence, we present a model that analyzes the welfare effects of heterogeneous
club objectives. So far, most models have assumed that leagues were homogeneous in the sense
that all clubs maximize identical objective functions.
Traditionally, these objectives were either profit maximization or win maximization.
Exceptions are Rascher (1997) and Vrooman (1997, 2000), who introduced a league in which
owners maximize a combination of profits and wins. This objective function is more general
than are the traditional assumptions because it allows club owners to trade off profits for wins.
Even with this more general objective function, however, the league is still modeled as
homogeneous because all the club owners maximize identical objective functions.
Our major contribution in this respect is the introduction of heterogeneous objective
functions. This extension allows us to compare mixed leagues in which club owners maximize
different objective functions with homogeneous leagues in which all the club owners maximize
identical objective functions. Mixed leagues have not yet been modeled in sports economics
despite the fact that most major leagues are mixed leagues. For example, the most valuable
team in 2008, according to Eorbes, Manchester United, is fully owned by the Glazer family and
may be regarded as a profit-maximizing club. In the prestigious Union of European Football
Associations (UEFA) Champions League, Manchester United competes against clubs such as
Real Madrid, F.C. Internazionale Milano, and F.C. Barcelona. Since these clubs are organized
as (not-for-profit) members associations, they should be characterized as win-maximizing
clubs.
Second, and most importantly, we explicitly integrate the consumer (fan) into our analysis
in order to compare social welfare in homogeneous and mixed leagues. We derive club-specific
demand and revenue from a general fan utility function by assuming that a fan's willingness to
pay depends on fan type, on the preferred team's winning percentage, and on competitive
balance.
Using this approach, we are able to extend the literature by providing an integrated
framework to analyze welfare effects. In particular, we show that homogeneous leagues in
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which all clubs are profit maximizers dominate all other leagues; whereas, mixed leagues in
which small-market clubs are profit maximizers and large-market clubs are win maximizers
(type-I mixed leagues) are dominated by all other leagues. In addition, we show that, from a
welfare perspective, large-market clubs win too often in (purely) win-maximizing and type-I
mixed leagues; whereas, small-market clubs win too many games in (purely) profit-maximizing
leagues and in mixed leagues in which the large-market clubs are profit maximizers and the
small-market clubs are win maximizers (type-II mixed leagues).
These results have important policy implications. For example, they show that—contrary
to prevailing claims—social welfare would increase if clubs were reorganized from win-
maximizing, non-profit members associations to profit-maximizing (public or private)
corporations. Moreover, it is socially desirable to reorganize large-market clubs first because
in mixed leagues it is better if the large-market clubs maximize profits instead of the small-
market clubs. Furthermore, the efficiency of measures that increase the competitiveness of
small-market clubs depends on the league type. If the large-market clubs are profit maximizers,
for example, small-market clubs should win fewer rather than more games.
Finally, we derive new insights regarding the invariance proposition. Most importantly,
the invariance proposition with respect to revenue sharing does not hold in any league.
Revenue sharing affects both competitive balance and social welfare. In profit-maximizing
leagues, revenue sharing decreases competetive balance, and in win-maximizing leagues, it
increases competitive balance. In both cases, the effect on social welfare is positive because
profit-maximizing leagues have too much and win-maximizing leagues too little competitive
balance without revenue sharing. In mixed leagues, on the other hand, revenue-sharing
arrangements decrease competitive balance and social welfare. These results also have
important policy implications because they show how the effect of revenue sharing differs with
respect to the league type. Homogeneous leagues should introduce revenue sharing; mixed
leagues should not.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the next section, we present the
model framework and derive fan demand, club revenues, profits, and social welfare. In section
3, we consider homogeneous leagues in which all club owners are profit maximizers or win
maximizers. In section 4, we consider mixed leagues and differentiate two cases: (i) large-market
clubs are win maximizers and small-market clubs are profit maximizers and (ii) vice versa.
Section 5 presents the welfare analysis, where we compare the different types of league with
respect to competitive balance and social welfare. In section 6, we analyze the effect of revenue
sharing on competitive balance and social welfare in mixed leagues. Finally, section 7
summarizes the main results and their policy implications.
2. Model
We model a two-club league where both clubs participate in a non-cooperative game and
invest independently a certain amount in playing talent. Each club / = 1,2 generates its own
revenues, denoted by R¡, according to a fan demand function depending on the match quality. We
assume that there are two types of club: a large-market club with a high drawing potential and a
small-market club with a low drawing potential. Talent investments, denoted by x, for club /,
determine the match quality and therefore, through fan demand, the revenue of both clubs.
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Fan Demand, Club Revenues, and Profits
Fan demand for a match with quality 9, is derived as follows.^ We assume a continuum of
fans who differ in their willingness to pay for a match between club i and cluby with quality ç,.
Every fan k has a certain preference for match quality that is measured by %k- For simplicity, we
assume that these preferences are uniformly distributed in [0, 1]; that is, the measure of
potential fans is 1. Furthermore, we assume a constant marginal utility of quality and define the
net utility of fan %k as maxIG^q-, - p¡, 0}. At price />,, the fan who is indifferent to the
consumption of the product is given by 9* = /',7c,.'* Hence, the measure of fans who purchase at
Pi is derived as 1 — 6* = {q¡ — p,)lqi. The fan demand function of club i = 1, 2 is therefore given
where mieW^ represents the market size parameter of club /. We assume that clubs are
heterogeneous with respect to their market size or drawing potential. Without loss of
generality, we assume throughout this article that club 1 is the large-market club with a high
drawing potential and club 2 is the small-market club with a low drawing potential; that is,
m\ > W2. As a consequence, the large club generates higher demand for a given set of
parameters (pi, q¡) than does the small club. Since we consider a two-club league, we can
normalize one market size parameter to unity such that m^ .= m and W2 := 1. We assume m
e (m, m) with m := 1 and w := 2.*
By normalizing all other costs (e.g., stadium and broadcasting costs) to zero, we see that
club i's revenue is simply R¡ = p¡ • d(m¡,p¡, q,). Then, the club will choose the profit-maximizing
price p* = qi/2.^ Given this profit-maximizing price, club i's revenue depends solely on the
quality of the match and is derived as
Ä- = ^9,-- (1)
Following Dietl and Lang (2008), we assume that match quality ç, depends on two factors: the
probability of club ¡"s success and the uncertainty of outcome. Furthermore, we assume that
both factors enter the quality function as a linear combination with equal weights; that is,
quality = probability of success + uncertainty of outcome.^
We measure the probability of club i's success by the win percentage iv,- of this club. The
win percentage is characterized by the contest-success function (CSF), which maps the vector
(,X|, X2) of talent investment into probabilities for each club. We apply the logit approach, which
' We follow the approach in Faleonieri, Palomino, and Sákovics (2004); Dietl and Lang (2008); and Dietl, Lang, and
Rathke (2009).
'' The price p¡ can, for example, be interpreted as the gate price or the subscription fee for TV coverage of the match.
' Note that fan demand increases in quality, albeit with a decreasing rate; that is, ddldq; > 0 and d^dlèq^ < 0.
^ Note that we also have to bound m from above in order to guarantee positive equilibrium investments in the win-
maximizing league and the type-I mixed league.
' Note that the optimal price is increasing in quality, that is, op*jdq¡ > 0.
' We will see below that this specification of the quality function gives rise to a quadratic revenue function widely used in
the sports economics literature.
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is the most widely used functional form of a CSF in sporting contests.' The win percentage of
club / = 1, 2 in this imperfectly discriminating contest is then given by
7T7
A,-r Ay
with i, j = 1, 2, / # / Given that the win percentages must sum up to unity, we obtain the
adding-up constraint: wj= \ - w/. In our model, we adopt the contest-Nash conjectures ox¡/dxj
= 0 and compute the derivative of Equation 2 as ow¡/dxi = Xj/{Xi + Xjf.^^ The uncertainty of
outcome is measured by the competitive balance in the league. Following Szymanski (2003),
Dietl and Lang (2008), and Vrooman (2008), we specify competitive balance by the product of
the winning percentages
CB{xi, Xj) = w¡ [x¡, Xj) Wj [xi, Xj) = -—!--i—2 , (3)
{Xi-\-Xj)
with i, i = 1, 2, / # / Note that competitive balance CB(-) attains its maximum of 1/4 for a
completely balanced league in which both clubs invest the same amount in talent such that wj =
W2 = 1/2. A less balanced league is then characterized by a lower value of CB(-).
With the specification of the win percentage given by Equation 2 and competitive balance
given by Equation 3, the quality function is derived as
qi {xi, Xj) = w¡ {xi, Xj) -I- Wi {x¡, Xj) Wj {x¡, Xj), (4)
with i,j = 1,2, i # / Plugging Equation 4 into Equation 1 and noting that Wj = \ - w¡, we
derive the revenue function of club / = 1, 2 as
R¡{xi, Xj) = ^q¡{x¡, Xj) = 'j ^2w¡{xi,Xj) - Wi {x¡,Xj)^], (5)
with m\ = m and W2 = 1. This "well-behaved," club-specific revenue function is consistent with
the revenue functions used, for example, in Hoehn and Szymanski (1999), Szymanski (2003),
Szymanski and Késenne (2004), Késenne (2006, 2007), and Vrooman (2007, 2008). However, in
contrast to the articles quoted, we have derived our revenue function from consumer
preferences and thus are able to perform a welfare analysis." The cost function of club / = 1,2
is given by C{x¡) = cx¡, where c is the marginal unit cost of talent.'^
' The logit CSF was generally introduced by Tullock (1980) and was subsequently axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) and
Clark and Riis (1998). An alternative functional form would be the probit CSF (e.g., Lazear and Rosen 1981; Dixit
1987) and the difference-form CSF (e.g., Hirshleifer 1989). For applications in sporting contests, see, for example,
Szymanski (2003); Szymanski and Késenne (2004); and Dietl, Franck, and Lang (2008).
'" See Szymanski (2004).
" Note that the fans' preferences in the quality function (given by Eqn. 4) for own team winning and competitive
balance is equal for both clubs. As a consequence, the parameters of the linear term )v, and the quadratic term vv? in
the revenue function (given by Eqn. 5) are equal for both clubs. Without this simplifying assumption, the relationship
between competitive balance in the win-maximizing league and in the profit-maximizing league would be
indeterminate (see Fort and Quirk 2004; Késenne 2007, p. 42).
'^ By assuming a competitive labor market, the market clearing cost of a unit of talent is the same for every club.
Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we do not take into account non-labor costs and normalize the fixed capital cost
to zero. Note that the results derived from this cost function do not necessarily hold for a more general cost function.
See Vrooman (1995) for a more general cost function where clubs have different marginal costs or Késenne (2007) for
a cost function with a fixed capital cost.
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The profit function of club i = 1, 2 is then given by
-CXi,Tj.^'v \-\ — P í\- v ^ f^í\-\ —
;i/\Xi, Xjj — i\i\Xi, Xjj L-yxi) —
with i,j = \,2, i ¥= j and m\ = m, m2 = 1.
Social Welfare
Social welfare is given by the sum of aggregate consumer (fan) surplus, aggregate club
profit, and aggregate player salaries. Aggregate consumer surplus is computed by summing up
the consumer surplus from fans of club 1 and club 2. The consumer surplus CS, from fans of
club / = 1, 2 in turn corresponds to the integral of the demand function d(m¡, pi, q,) from the
equilibrium price p* = ql2 to the maximal price ^ , = ç,- that fans are willing to pay for quality ^ ,
PI II
CSi= \d(mi,pi,qi)dpi= mi^^—^dpi=-^qi,
J J qi 8
with m\ = m and m2= 1. By assuming that the players' utility corresponds to their salary, the
total players' utility is given by the aggregate salary payments PS = cx\ + cx2 in the league.
Addition of the aggregate consumer surplus, aggregate club profit, and aggregate salary
payments produces social welfare as
^' • ' ' :uX2)\. • (6)
Note that salary payments do not directly infiuence social welfare because salaries merely
represent a transfer from clubs to players. As a consequence, social welfare depends only on the
quality of the league.
In the proposition that follows we derive the welfare-maximizing win percentages.
PROPOSITION 1. Social welfare is maximized for the following win percentages:
PROOF. See the Appendix.
The proposition shows that a certain degree of imbalance is socially desirable. More
precisely, from a welfare point of view, it is desirable that the large club wins more often than
does the small club, since H'*>IVJ, with m > \. From Equation 7, we compute the welfare
optimal level of competitive balance as
m
CB* = 2 •(m + 1)
Note that the welfare optimal level of competitive balance decreases in the market size
parameter w; that is, dCB*ldm < 0. As a consequence, the higher the asymmetry between the
two clubs in terms of market size, the higher the welfare optimal degree of imbalance in the
league. In other words, the league should be more imbalanced with the large club winning more
often than the small club, the bigger the difference between the clubs.
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3. Homogeneous Leagues
In this section, we first consider a homogeneous league consisting of two clubs with pure
profit-maximizing team owners (the so-called PM league) and then a league with pure win-
percentage-maximizing team owners (the so-called WM league). In the subsequent section, we
consider a mixed league in which one team owner maximizes club profits and one team owner
maximizes the club's win percentage (we call such leagues a "type-I" and a "type-II" mixed
league, respectively).
Profit-Maximizing Clubs
We assume that both clubs are profit maximizers. The maximization problem of club / =
1, 2 is therefore given by max;c,.2;o 7t, = /?,(x,,xy)-C(x,). The corresponding first-order
conditions yield'^
^ 2 - c = 0 and ^ = ! ^ - c = 0. 8
5x2 2 ( + ) ^
The equilibrium talent investments in a homogeneous league with pure profit-maximizing clubs
are then computed as
i ""'" ^ ^ Y (9)
Using Equations 2 and 9, we derive the following equilibrium win percentages in a PM league:
We derive x{^¡x^^ = ^ /^> \ VwjG (W, m). Thus, in equilibrium, the large club invests more in
playing talent than does the small club because the marginal revenue of talent investments is
higher for the club with the larger market size. Moreover, a bigger difference between the two
clubs in terms of market size induces both clubs to increase their investment level in equilibrium,
that is, ôxf"^/dm>0 for / = 1, 2. The large club, however, increases its investments in playing
talent more than does the small club; that is, dx^^/dm>ôx2^/dm. It follows that competitive
balance CB'''^ = wf'^w'^'^ decreases in the market size parameter m; that is, ôCB'^^lôm < 0.
Social welfare is computed in the next lemma.
LEMMA 1. Social welfare in a PM league is given by W'''^ = {2/S){mq^'^ -l-qÇ'^), with
PROOF. See the Appendix.
Win-Maximizing Clubs
In this section, both clubs are assumed to be win maximizers. Each club chooses
independently a level of talent in order to maximize the level of own talents subject to its budget
'^  It is easy to show that the second-order conditions for a maximum are satisfied.
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constraint.''' The maximization problem of club / = 1, 2 is then given by max;t,^o Xi subject to
cXi < R,{Xi, xj). The first-order conditions for this maximization problem yield
where Xi is the Lagrange multiplier for club / = 1, 2. It follows that each club will spend all its
revenue on playing talent such that the optimality conditions for this maximization problem are
reduced to
^c (for club 1) and - i í l ± ^ = c (for club 2). (10)
4 ( + )
The equilibrium talent investments in a homogeneous league with pure win-maximizing clubs
are computed from Equation 10 as
f - l ) 3m{2-m)\
In order to guarantee positive equilibrium investments, the difference between the two clubs in
terms of market size must not be too large. Formally, the market size parameter m of club 1 has
to be bounded from above such that m e {m, m) = (1, 2).'^




2-m,. WM > 1 V wje (OT, w ) .
Thus, in equilibrium, the large club always invests more in playing talent than does the small
club. By comparing the equilibrium investments in a WM league with the corresponding
investments in a PM league, we deduce that a large club in a WM league always invests more
than does the same large club in a PM league. The opposite is true for a small club, but only if
the market size parameter is sufficiently large; that is, x{'^<x^'^ yme{m,m) and
xÇ^>x^'^om^\.6\. In a WM league, however, the large (small) club always has a higher
(lower) win percentage in equilibrium than has the same large (small) club in a PM league
independent of the market size, that is, wf*''^  >w^'^ and w^^ < w '^*' 'ime{rn, m).
Moreover, in a WM league, a bigger difference between the two clubs in terms of market
size induces the large club to increase its investment level and the small club to decrease its
investment level in equilibrium; that is, ôx^^/dm>0 and ôx^^/ôm<0.^^ The result of a
''* We choose this objective function since, according to Késenne (2006, p. 417), "win maximization is not an operational
objective, because clubs cannot control their winning percentage. Clubs can only maximize the talents ofthe team. The
best guarantee for a high winning percentage is fielding a performing team by attracting the best players."
'* For m a 2, the optimal choice for the small club is zero. Since we are not interested in a situation where a club is not
participating, we choose to restrict the range of m to ensure positive equilibrium investments.
" Note that the increase in talent investments of the large club is bigger than the decrease of the small club in absolute
values; that is, dx^"/em>\dx^"/ôm\.
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bigger difference between the clubs is, similar to a PM league, a decrease of competitive balance
in the WM league; that is, dCB^^Idm < 0.
Social welfare is computed in the next lemma.'^
LEMMA 2. Social welfare in a WM league is given by W^'^ = {7,ß){mqY'^ +q^'^) with
f and 9|*'^ l
PROOF. See the Appendix.
4. Mixed Leagues
In this section, we model a league in which clubs are heterogeneous with respect to their
objective function. We differentiate two types of so-called mixed leagues. A type-I mixed league
is a league where the large-market club is a win maximizer and the small-market club a profit
maximizer. A type-II mixed league is, analogously, a league where the large-market club is a
profit maximizer and the small-market club is a win maximizer.
Type-I Mixed League
We assume that the large club 1 is a win maximizer and the small club 2 is a
profit maximizer. The maximization problem for club 1 is given by max;^ , ^o x\ subject to
cx\ < R\{x\, X2), and for club 2 it is given by max.v2>o 112 = Riixx,xi) — cx2.
The first-order conditions for this problem are similar to the homogeneous league cases
above. Consider Equation 10 for the large, win-maximizing club 1 and Equation 8 for the small,
profit-maximizing club 2. Simple algebra and rearrangements of the first-order conditions yield
the following equilibrium talent investments in a type-I mixed league:'^
(12)
^ 32c
Using Equations 2 and 12, we derive the following equilibrium win percentages in a type-I
mixed league:
Type! Typei\ (\/m{l6 + m)-m
'" )y 4 ' 4
The relationship between the equilibrium investments is given by
\ypeii = - 7 r ¿ - — " ^ , / - > 1 V w e ( w , m).
X2 yJ\6 + m — ^^/rn
Thus, a large, win-maximizing club invests more in talents than does a small, profit-maximizing
club independent of their market size. This result is intuitive since both the larger market size
" Note that in a WM league, aggregate club profits are zero because each club spends all its revenue on playing talent;
that is, cxY" = Rf", i = 1, 2.
'* Note that m <Tñ guarantees positive equilibrium investments of club 2.
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and the win-maximizing behavior induce club 1 to invest more than club 2. Similar to a WM
league, equilibrium investments of the large, win-maximizing (small, profit-maximizing) club
increase (decrease) in the market size parameter m, with dx^^'" Idm>\dx2'" lôm\. As a
consequence, competitive balance CB^y"'= w^^^''^'•w^'"'' decreases in the market size
parameter m; that is, ôCB^'''"''tôm < 0.
Social welfare is computed in the next lemma."
LEMMA 3. Social welfare in a type-I mixed league is given by
(3/8)(
and
PROOF. See the Appendix.
Type-II Mixed League
In this last case, we assume that the large club 1 is a profit maximizer and the small club 2
a win maximizer. The maximization problem for club 1 is given by max ;^, ¿Q n\ =
Riix\,X2) — cx\, and for club 2 it is given by max^^^o-^z subject to CX2 ^ R2ÍX1, X2).
For the first-order conditions, consider Equation 8 for club 1 and Equation 10 for club 2.
The equilibrium investments are then computed as
Typeii_ m{l6m-\-\4) + l - \ /16m+l(6w-|- l)
'*^ i ~ XTTÍ^ '
^^'^'" (13)
\/16w4-l(4m-H)-(l-H2w)
Using Equations 2 and 13, we derive the following equilibrium win percentages in a type-II
mixed league:
/ Typell Typell\ _ (^ + 4 w —\/16w-|- 1 y/\6m+\ — \
The relationship between the equilibrium investments is given by
nr, m).
Thus, in a type-II mixed league, a small, win-maximizing club invests more in playing talent
than does a large, profit-maximizing club independent of their market size. We derive the
following corollary:
COROLLARY 1. In a mixed league in which clubs differ with respect to their objective
function, the win-maximizing club always invests more than does the profit-maximizing club
independent of the market size.
Note that the win-maximizing club 1 spends all its revenue on playing talent; that is, cvp'"'=/?f""'', such that it
makes zero profits.
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The fact that the large, profit-maximizing club invests less than does the small, win-
maximizing club shows that the clubs' objective functions have a stronger influence on the
investment behavior than does the market size. In particular, in a type-II mixed league, the win-
maximizing behavior of club 2 overcompensates for the positive effect on talent investments of
club 1 's larger market size.
Increasing the market size w in a type-II mixed league induces the large, profit-maximizing
club to increase and the small, win-maximizing club to decrease their investment level in
equilibrium, with ôx]^'""/dm>\dxl^'"'"ldm\. As a consequence, competitive balance
^ ^Typeii_^Typeii ¡„creases in the market size parameter m; that is, dCB^y'"'"ldm > 0.
Social welfare is computed in the next lemma.
LEMMA 4. Social welfare in a type-II mixed league is given by
Typell _ ^m{m—\) — \-\-\/\6m-\-\ j-yp^,, _ ^/Y6m+l{4m -|-1 ) — ( 1 -fl 2w)
PROOF. See the Appendix.
5. Welfare Analysis
In this section, we analyze how the clubs' objective functions influence social welfare.
However, before proceeding with the welfare analysis, we provide a comparison between the
leagues with respect to competitive balance.
PROPOSITION 2.
(a) The PM league dominates all other leagues with respect to competitive balance.
(b) The type-I mixed league is dominated by all other leagues with respect to competitive
balance.
(c) The type-II mixed league dominates the WM league with respect to competitive
balance if the market size of the large club is sufficiently large.
PROOF. See the Appendix.
The proposition shows that a league with two profit-maximizing clubs is the most
balanced league; that is, CB'''^ > CB^ for n e {WM, Typel, Typell}; whereas, a mixed league in
which the large club is a win maximizer and the small club a profit maximizer proves to be the
least balanced league; that is, CB'^^""' < CB^ for (x e {PM, WM, Typell}. The homogeneous
win-maximizing league and the type-II mixed league are somewhere in between, depending on
the market size parameter. Moreover, if the difference between the large club and the small club
is sufficiently large, then the type-II mixed league is more balanced than is the WM league; that
is, CB'^yP'" > CB^'^ <:> w > m^* - 1.31.'°
Together with the results from sections 3 and 4, we derive from Proposition 2 that, in a
type-II mixed league, the small (large) club always has a higher (lower) win percentage in
° See also Késenne (2007, p. 46). In contrast to Késenne (2007), we derive, however, that the PM league is the most
balanced league.
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Figure 1. Equilibrium Win Percentages in the DifTerent Leagues
equilibrium than does the large (small) club in a PM league independent of the market size; that
is, wl^''"" > w^'^ > 1 /2 and ivp'"'" < wÇ^ < 1 /2 Vw e (w, w). The opposite is true with respect to
a type-I mixed league: The small (large) club in a type-II mixed league always has a
lower (higher) win percentage in equilibrium than has the large (small) club in a type-I mixed
league independent ofthe market size; that is, l/2<u'p''"'"<M'p''"' and 1/2 > vvp''"'" > ivp''"'
y m 6 {rn, m). The relationship between the win percentages in a type-II mixed league and a WM
league, however, are dependent on the market size parameter. Formally W2''"' <w^^ and
^^Typeii ^ ^^WM jf ^^¿ Qj^ jy ¡f ^ > ^ ^ s jj^gsg results are depicted in Figure 1.
We now start our welfare analysis and first compare the welfare-maximizing win
percentages {w*, w*) and the respective equilibrium win percentages in the different leagues.
The following results can be deduced:
PROPOSITION 3. From a welfare point of view, the small (large) club wins too often and the
large (small) club does not win often enough in the PM league and the type-II mixed league (in
the WM league and the type-I mixed league).
PROOF. See the Appendix.
The proposition shows that the degree of competitive balance is too high, and a more
unbalanced league is socially desirable in pure profit-maximizing leagues. A decrease in the win
percentage of the small club and an increase in the win percentage of the large club would thus
result in higher social welfare.'^ '
The opposite is true in pure win-maximizing leagues and type-I mixed leagues: The degree
of competitive balance is too low, and a more balanced league is socially desirable. The large
club wins too often, and the small club does not win often enough. An increase in the win
percentage of the small club and a decrease in the win percentage of the large club would thus
result in higher social welfare in a WM league and a type-I mixed league.
In mixed leagues in which the large club is a profit maximizer and the small club is a win
maximizer (type-11 mixed leagues), the degree of competitive balance is also too low from a
welfare perspective. The difference from the WM league and the type-I mixed league is,
however, that the small club wins too often and the large club does not win often enough.^^ A
decrease in the win percentage of the small club and an increase in the win percentage of the
large club would result in higher social welfare in a type-II mixed league.
How do the different leagues compare to each other with respect to social welfare? More
precisely, which league approximates the welfare-maximizing win percentages from Proposition
^' See also Szymanski (2006) and Dietl and Lang (2008).
^^ Recall that in a type-II mixed league, the small club is the dominant team that always invests more than does the large
club, independent of the market sizes.
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1 in the best way? Similar to Proposition 2, a unique ordering between the leagues regarding
social welfare does not exist. However, we can derive the following results:
PROPOSITION 4.
(a) The PM league dominates all other leagues with respect to social welfare.
(b) The type-I mixed league is dominated by all other leagues with respect to social
welfare.
(c) The type-II mixed league dominates the WM league with respect to social welfare if
the market size of the large club is sufficiently large.
PROOF. See the Appendix.
A homogeneous league in which both clubs are profit maximizers (PM league) generates
the highest level of social welfare; that is, W'''^ > W^foT\ie {Typel, Typell, WM}. The PM
league is the welfare-dominating league not because it is the most balanced league but because
the equilibrium win percentages (wf*', wÇ'^) and competitive balance CB''^ in the PM league
approximate the welfare-maximizing win percentages (w*, w*) and competitive balance CB* in
the best way.
On the other hand, a mixed league in which the small club is a profit maximizer and the
large club is a win maximizer (type-I mixed league) generates the lowest level of social welfare;
that is, W'^yP" < W^ for \x e {Typell, PM, WM}. In this league the equilibrium win percentages
(wp'"'', W2^'"'') and competitive balance CB^^"' are furthest away from the corresponding
welfare optimal win percentages and competitive balance.^^ The mixed league in which the
large club is a profit maximizer and the small club is a win maximizer (type-II mixed league)
and the homogeneous league in which both clubs are win maximizers (WM league) are
somewhere in between, depending on the market size parameter. More precisely, social welfare
is higher in the type-II mixed league than in the WM league if the difference between the clubs
in terms of market size is sufficiently large; that is, w'^^''"" > W^'^ o m > m^ '^ 1.72.
6. Revenue Sharing
In this section, we analyze the welfare effect of revenue sharing. In our model, the share of
revenues that is assigned to the home team is given by the parameter a e [1/2, 1], while (1 - a) is
assumed to be the share of revenues received by the away team. The after-sharing revenues of
club /, denoted by Kf, are then given by R* = aRi + {l-a)Rj, with a e [1/2, 1] and iJ = 1, 2, / T^
j . The impact of revenue sharing on competitive balance is stated in the following proposition:^'*
PROPOSITION 5.
(a) Revenue sharing decreases competitive balance in a homogeneous league with profit-
maximizing clubs; whereas, it increases competitive balance in a homogeneous league
with win-maximizing clubs.
^' See also Figure 1.
'^' Note that our results are robust with respect to pool revenue sharing, which is another popular form of revenue
sharing in sports leagues. Under a pool-sharing arrangement, each club receives an a-share of its revenue and an equal
(1 - a)-share ofa league revenue pool, where a e [0, 1]. In this case, the after-sharing revenues of club i are given by
/?* Ä H ( l ) / 2 ] ( )
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(b) Revenue sharing decreases competitive balance in mixed leagues where clubs differ
with respect to their objective function.
PROOF. See the Appendix.
ad (a) The effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance in homogeneous leagues has
been extensively analyzed in the literature. In a league with two profit-maximizing clubs,
revenue sharing reduces the incentive to invest in playing talent for both clubs. This so-called
dulling effect of revenue sharing, however, is stronger for the small club than for the large
club.'^ ^ As a consequence, the small club will reduce its investment level more than will the large
club. Since the large club dominates the small club in terms of talent, a higher degree of revenue
sharing produces a more unbalanced league and thus decreases competitive balance.^*
However, in a league with two win-maximizing clubs, any revenue-sharing arrangement
that transfers revenues from the large to the small club induces the small club to increase and
the large club to decrease its talent investments. As a consequence, revenue sharing improves
competitive balance by assuming again that the large club is the dominant team in terms of
talent."
ad (b) In mixed leagues where clubs differ with respect to their objective function, revenue
sharing has, similar to the PM league, a dulling effect on the investment incentives. Both types
of club reduce their investments in playing talent through a higher degree of revenue sharing.
The profit-maximizing club, however, will reduce its investments more than will the win-
maximizing club (see Table Al). Since, in both types of mixed leagues, the profit-maximizing
club always invests less than does the win-maximizing club independent of the market size (see
Corollary 1), a higher degree of revenue sharing decreases competitive balance and produces a
more unbalanced league.
The welfare implications of these results are stated in the following corollary.
COROLLARY 2. Revenue sharing increases social welfare in homogeneous leagues; whereas,
it decreases social welfare in mixed leagues where clubs differ with respect to their objective
function.
The first part of the corollary shows that revenue sharing is beneficial to social welfare in
both types of homogeneous league. The mechanism behind this result, however, differs between
the leagues. According to Proposition 3, in a PM league (WM league), the small (large) club wins
too often and the large (small) club does not win often enough from a welfare point of view. In
other words, the degree of competitive balance in a league with profit-maximizing (win-
maximizing) clubs is too high (low). Since revenue sharing decreases (increases) competitive
balance in a PM league (WM league), it will increase social welfare in both homogeneous leagues.
In contrast, the second part of the corollary states that revenue sharing is detrimental to
social welfare in mixed leagues where clubs have different objective functions. The intuition is
as follows: We know from Proposition 3 that, from a welfare perspective, in both types of
mixed leagues, the profit-maximizing club does not win often enough and the win-maximizing
club wins too often (independent of the market size). In a type-II mixed league, the small, win-
maximizing club invests more than does the large, profit-maximizing club. Revenue sharing
decreases competitive balance by inducing the profit-maximizing club to decrease its
^^ The notion "dulling effect" was introduced by Szymanski and Késenne (2004).
*^ See, for example, Szymanski and Késenne (2004), Késenne (2005, 2007), and Dietl and Lang (2008).
" See, for example, Késenne (2006, 2007).
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investments more than does the small, win-maximizing club. As a result, both clubs depart from
the welfare-maximizing win percentages, and social welfare declines. For a type-I mixed league,
the reasoning is the same except for the fact that the win-maximizing club is the large club that
already invests more than does the small, profit-maximizing club.
7. Summary and Policy Implications
In this article, we develop a contest model of a team sports league to compare social
welfare in homogeneous leagues in which all clubs maximize identical objective functions and
mixed leagues in which clubs maximize different objective functions. Starting from a general
fan utility function, we provide an integrated framework to analyze welfare effects.
In particular, we show that a unique ordering regarding social welfare does not exist:
Leagues in which all clubs are profit maximizers dominate all other leagues; whereas, mixed
leagues in which small-market clubs are profit maximizers and large-market clubs are win
maximizers (type-I mixed leagues) are dominated by all other leagues. Mixed leagues in which
the large-market clubs are profit maximizers and the small-market clubs are win maximizers
(type-II mixed leagues) dominate a homogeneous league of win-maximizing clubs if the market
size of the large-market clubs is sufficiently large.
In addition, we show that, from a welfare perspective, small-market clubs win too many
games in (purely) profit-maximizing and type-II mixed leagues; whereas, the large-market clubs
win too often in (purely) win-maximizing and type-I mixed leagues. These results show that
social welfare would increase if clubs were reorganized from non-profit members associations
to profit-maximizing corporations. Some leagues, however, still try to prevent the
transformation of professional sports clubs from not-for-profit members associations to
profit-maximizing public or private corporations. A typical example is the German Soccer
League (DFL). The DFL allows its clubs to hive off their professional football units by forming
a public or private corporation under the provision that 50% of the voting rights plus one
voting right will remain with the members association. This 50 + 1 rule practically prevents the
clubs from changing their overall objective from win maximization to profit maximization. The
major rationale for the 50 -i- 1 rule was to ensure that fans have a voice in their club's decision.
Our results show that fans may benefit from a reorganization of their clubs into public or
private corporations. If such a reorganization takes place, it is socially desirable to reorganize
large-market clubs first because in mixed leagues it is better if the large-market clubs maximize
profits instead of the small-market clubs.
Furthermore, the efficiency of measures that increase the competitiveness of small-market
clubs depends on the league type. If the large-market clubs are profit maximizers, for example,
small-market clubs should win fewer rather than more games. In such leagues, all measures in
favor of small-market clubs, such as transfer restrictions and reverse-order drafts, can be
dangerous because they may lead to a decrease instead of an increase in social welfare.
Finally, we derive new insights regarding the invariance proposition with respect to
revenue sharing. In our model, the invariance proposition with respect to revenue sharing does
not hold in any league. Revenue sharing affects both competitive balance and social welfare. In
pure profit-maximizing leagues, revenue sharing decreases competitive balance, and in pure
win-maximizing leagues, it increases competitive balance. In both cases, the effect on social
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welfare is positive because profit-maximizing leagues have too much competitive balance and
win-maximizing leagues too little competitive balance without revenue sharing. In mixed
leagues, on the other hand, revenue-sharing arrangements decrease competitive balance by
inducing the profit-maximizing clubs, which already invest less, to decrease their investments
more than do the win-maximizing clubs. As a result, social welfare decreases in both types of
mixed league through the introduction of revenue-sharing arrangements.
The current revenue-sharing arrangements differ widely among professional leagues all over
the world. In 1876, Major League Baseball in the United States introduced a 50-50 split of gate
receipts that was reduced over time. Since 2003, all the clubs in the American League have to put
34% of their locally generated revenue (gate, concession, television, etc.) into a central pool,
which is then divided equally among clubs. The current revenue-sharing arrangement of the
National Football League (NFL) in the United States secures the visiting team 40% of the gate
receipts (revenues from luxury boxes, parking, and concessions are excluded from this sharing
arrangement). In the Australian Football League, gate receipts were split evenly between the
home and the visiting team. This 50-50 split was finally abolished in 2000. In Europe, there is less
gate revenue sharing. The soccer leagues have adopted various forms of gate revenue sharing in
their history. For instance, in England, until the early 1980s, up to 20% of the gate receipts were
given to the visiting teams in league matches. Gate revenue sharing, however, is quite common in
most cup competitions with a knockout system. Our model suggests that the welfare effect of
these revenue-sharing arrangements depends on the prevailing league type. In homogeneous
leagues, such as the NFL or DFL, revenue sharing may increase social welfare. In mixed leagues,
such as the UEFA Champions League, the English Premier League, and many other leagues
around the world, revenue sharing may decrease social welfare.
Appendix
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1. Social welfare lV = (3/S){mqi+q2) = {i/S)[m(2wi—w\)+2w2 — W2] can be expressed
in terms of w, only. Note that 92 = 2^2 — v/\ = 2(1 — W|) - (1 — >vi) = \ — v/\. By substitution, we compute
W = (3/8)[m(2w] — H )^ + (l — H^)]. Maximizing W with respect to \V\ yields the welfare optimal win percentage
iv* = m/(m+ 1). Due to the adding-up constraint, we derive iv* = 1 —11'* = \l(m+ 1). This proves the proposition. QED.
PROOF OF LEMMA 1. Aggregate consumer surplus in a PM league is given by CS'"'" =
and ,f'^
Addition of aggregate club profits and aggregate salary payments yields aggregate club revenues, given by
R^'^ + R2^ = [\H)(mq^'^ + q2"). Recall that salary payments do not directly influence social welfare because salaries
merely represent a transfer from clubs to players. By summing up aggregate club revenues and aggregate consumer
surplus, we derive
QED.
PROOF OF LEMMA 2. Similar to the PM league, we derive aggregate consumer surplus in a WM league as
^ ^ + g f " ) , with
3(2m-l) 3(2-m)ml
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Aggregate club profits are zero because each club spends all its revenue on playing talent; that is, cxf' = Rf". As
a consequence, aggregate salary payments are derived as cx'^" + cx^" = R!^" + R^'^ = {l/4)[mq^'^ + q^").
By summing up aggregate salary payments and aggregate consumer surplus, we derive
l. QED.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3. Similar to the PM and WM leagues, aggregate consumer surplus in a type-I mixed league is
given by CS^'''"'' = {\ß)(mqj"'" +gl^'""), with
and
Note that club 1 spends all its revenue on playing talent; that is, ex]'''"' = R]'''"' = (m/A)q\""', such that it makes zero
profits. By summing up club 2's profit and salary payments, we derive club 2's revenue as ^^' '" ' = (1/4)9^''"''. Note
again that salaries represent a transfer from club 2 to its players. Addition of aggregate consumer surplus CS'^'"'', club
l's salary payments (m/4)çp''"', and club 2's revenue (1/4)^^''"' produces social welfare as
QED.
PROOF OF LEMMA 4. Similar to the proof for a type-I mixed league, we derive social welfare in a type-II mixed
league as
jr^ Tjpe;; 3 / Typelt . Typeii\ 3 [\/16m-l-1 - 1-)-m(8m(m-1)-f 5x/16m-H - 13)]
with
Typen_ 8m(m-l)- l -f \ /16m-H jyj,^,, i/T6m+T(4m-H 1)-(1 +12m)
9i ^2 and q^ = — .
QED.
PROOFOF PROPOSITION 2. Competitive balance CB\m) with \i s {PM, WM, Typel, Typell], as a function ofthe
market size parameter m, has the following properties:
(1) CB^(m), with n e {PM, WM, Typel, Typell) is a well-defined and continuous function in (m, m).
(2) CB\m) is a strictly increasing function for \i = Typell and a strictly decreasing function for \i e {PM, WM,
Typel] in (rn, in).
(3) CS™(l) = Cß"''«(l) = (l/4)>Cß^>''""(l) = CB^>''"'"(l) = ( l /8) (3 \ / i7- l l )«0 .17 and
(4) am s (m, m) such that OB'""{m) = CBf(m\ with n e {WM, Typel, Typell].
(5) a m e (m, m) such that CB"''^(m) = CB''(m), with ¡i e {PA/, 7>pe/, Typell].
(6) 3!m e (m, m) such that CB'^>''""'(m^'') = CB"'"(m^''), with m^" =< 1.3128.
From properties 1-4, we derive that CB''"(m) > CB^(m) Vm € (m, m), with n e { WM, Typel, Typell]. This proves
claim (a).
From properties 1-3 and 5, we derive that CB'^>''"\m) < CB^(m) Vm e (m, m ), with \i e {PM, WM, Typell]. This
proves claim (b).
From properties 1-3 and 6, we derive that CB'^'''""{m) > CB"'"(m) om> m'^" = 1.3128. This proves claim (c).
QED.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
(i) By comparing the welfare-maximizing win percentages
with the equilibrium win percentages in the PM league
and the type-II mixed league
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, . . , ,.f2 = -. , -. ,
V ' ' V 4m 4m J
we derive if*>iff and if* <if2 '^me{ni, m), with n s {PM, Typell}.
Thus, from a welfare point of view the small club wins too often and the large club does not win often enough in
both the PM league and the type-II mixed league.
(ii) By comparing the welfare-maximizing win percentages
m+\)
with the equilibrium win percentages in the WM league
\m+\ m+\
and the type-I mixed league
we derive if* <w\ and w* > »'2 ^"i ^ (ü2> '") with li s {WM, Typel}.
Thus, from a welfare point of view, the large club wins too often and the small club does not win often enough in
both the WM league and the type-I mixed league. QED.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 2, we derive that W(m) with |i e {PM, WM,
Typel, Typell}, as a function ofthe market size parameter m, has the following properties:
(1) W{m), with |i e {PM, WM, Typel, Typell}, is a well-defined and continuous function V(»i, m).
(2) W^(m), with n e {PM, WM, Typel, Typell}, is a strictly increasing function V(m, m).
«0.868> H' '> '" '"(2) = (3 /256 ) (11 \ / 53 - I -5 ) !BO.799>CB" ' ^ (2 ) = CB' '>'" '(2) = 3/4 .
(4) a m e (m, m), such that W''"{m) = H*(m), with \i e {WM, Typel, Typell}.
(5) am e (m, m), such that W"'"(m) = W^'im), with n 6 {PM, Typel, Typell}.
(6) 3!m 6 (m, m), such that W'^"""\m"') = W"'"(m'^), with m"' = 1.72.
From properties 1-4, we derive that W''"{m) > W^(m) V me{m, m), with n e {WM, Typel, Typell}. This proves
claim (a).
From properties 1-3 and 5, we derive that W'''>''"'(m) < W(m) V m e (m, m), with ^ € {PM, WM, Typell}. This
proves claim (b).
From properties 1-3 and 6, we derive that W'''>''""{m) > W"'"{m) o m > m"'== 1.72.
This proves claim (c). QED.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5
ad (a) The effect of revenue sharing on competitive balance in homogeneous leagues has been extensively analyzed
in the literature; see, for example, Szymanski and Késenne (2004), Késenne (2005, 2006, 2007), and Dietl and Lang
(2008). We omit the proof and refer to the articles quoted.
ad (b) In a first step (1), we will show that revenue sharing decreases competitive balance in mixed leagues where
clubs differ with respect to their objective function but are symmetric with respect to their market size; that is, m = 1. In a
second step (2), we will show numerically that this claim is true more generally for clubs with asymmetric market size.
(1) By normalizing the market size parameter m of club 1 to unity, the revenues of club Í are given by
/;, = (l/4)g, = (l/4)(2H', —IV?) for Í = 1, 2. The after-sharing revenues of club /, denoted by /?*, are then given by
R* = ot.Ri + {\—a)Rj, with a e [1/2, 1], /, / = 1, 2, / # 7 . Without loss of generality, we assume that club 1 is a win
maximizer and club 2 a profit maximizer.
The maximization problem for the win-maximizing club 1 is given by max.vi^ o ^1 subject to cx\ <,R*{x],.X2).
Similar to section 3, the corresponding optimality condition yields
1 1
Y . ^ ' ^ ' ~ ' . i - i y i \ " I / ' ' /I \ ' / i ^ '
-^ 1
Note that Ä2 = (l/4)(2w2 —if2) = {l/'*)(' ~"^) ''"^ ' ° 'he adding-up constraint if2 = 1 — ifi.
The maximization problem for the profit-maximizing club 2 is given by max,¡£0 t2 = Ä2(-*-i' X2) — cx2. Similar to
section 3, the corresponding optimality condition yields
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(A2)
with dw,/dx2 = -(dw2¡dx2) due to the adding-up constraint. With dR2tdw2 = (1/2)(1 - W2) = (1/2)»',, BR¡tdw¡ = (1/2)(1
- w,), and dw2¡dx2 = x¡t{x¡ + x^f = vt'i[l/(xi + X2)], Equation A2 can be simplified as follows:
Combining Equations Al and A3, we compute
(A3)
Rearranging yields (l/4)[2iv5-(-(2a-l)H'J-2aH'i+(a-l)] =0. This equation implicitly characterizes the equilibrium
win percentage w* of club 1 as a function of the revenue-sharing parameter a. Applying the implicit function theorem
yields
ÔW*, 2w, (w.
The numerator and the denominator are both positive, since a e [1/2, 1] and wi > 1/2.
Remember that club 1 is the win-maximizing club that invests more in equilibrium than does the profit-maximizing
club 2. As a consequence, a higher degree of revenue sharing (i.e., a lower value of a) increases the difference between the
clubs' win percentages in equilibrium and thus produces a more unbalanced league.
(2) We provide a numerical simulation to show that revenue sharing decreases competitive balance in type-I and
type-II mixed leagues. Table Al, Panel a gives a numerical simulation for a type-I mixed league, where club 1 is the large,
win-maximizing club and club 2 is the small, profit-maximizing club. Table Al, Panel b provides a type-II mixed league
where club 1 is the large, profit-maximizing club and club 2 is the small, win-maximizing club. We differentiate the case
where the difference between both clubs in terms of market size is low (m = 1.1) and the case where the difference in
terms of market size is high (m = 1.9). The first column shows the degree of revenue sharing where a higher value of a
characterizes a league with a lower degree of revenue sharing. Note that a = 1 denotes a league with no revenue sharing,
whereas a = 1/2 characterizes a league with full revenue sharing. The next columns characterize the investment level x¡
and win percentage w¡ of club / = 1, 2, as well as the level of competitive balance CB in equilibrium. Without loss of
generality, we can normalize the marginal unit cost of talent c to unity.
Table Al shows that both types of club reduce their investment level in equilibrium through a higher degree of
revenue sharing. The profit-maximizing club, however, reduces its investment level in a stronger way than does the win-
maximizing club in both types of mixed league. As a consequence, the win percentage of the profit-maximizing club
decreases and the win percentage of the win-maximizing club increases. Since the profit-maximizing club always invests
less than does the win-maximizing club independent of the market size, competitive balance decreases and the (type-1 and
type-II) mixed league becomes more unbalanced through a higher degree of revenue sharing. QED.











Panel a: type-I mixed league
a = 1 0.265 0.062
a = 0.8 0.229 0.042
a = 0.6 0.185 0.025
a = 0.5 0.160 0.018
Panel b: type-II mixed league
a = 1 0.077 0.235
a = 0.8 0.053 0.212
a = 0.6 0.032 0.178

































































a, revenue-sharing parameter; m, market size parameter of club 1; x,, investment level, and w¡, win percentages of
club /• = 1, 2 in equilibrium; CB, level of competitive balance in equilibrium.
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